Fundamental Dilemmas
Developing countries are home to five out of the six billion people, but historically have contributed only around one quarter of greenhouse gases from energy consumption now accumulated in the atmosphere. Energy use and emissions per person in developing countries on average are still only around a quarter of that in industrialized countries.
Resources for economic restructuring are much more limited in developing countries, with average per capita incomes less than one quarter than those in the industrialized world. A compelling ethical case can thus be made that poorer countries should be free to develop economically without greenhouse gas constraints, while rich countries -which after all have built much of their wealth through energy-intensive industrialization -should go ahead and reduce their emissions in the global interest. Poorer countries insist on their 'right to develop', and greenhouse gas constraints (along with other environmental policies) are often seen as obstacles to development. As Adil Najam observed:
The principal and unchanged interest of the South has remained development and a better quality of life for its people; its principal fear, that the North is using environmental issues as an excuse to pull up the development ladder behind it. But limiting global warming to avoid the worst of the potential negative impacts will require a drastic change in the emissions trajectories in both rich and poor countries, so developing countries will need to take part in the effort. Developing countries already account for around half of annual global greenhouse gas emissions, and future emissions growth will come mainly from current developing countries.
Engaging key developing countries is also vital to help make greenhouse gas control politically acceptable in industrialized countries. There is little prospect of the United States taking on obligations under an international climate agreement if major developing countries, in particular China and India, do not have commitments. Where developing 2 Comparing GNP adjusted for purchasing power. The difference is even greater when comparing GNP at exchange rates. Data from World Resources Institute (WRI 2003 . 'Industrialized countries' is defined as OECD members and economies in transition (Russian Federation, Ukraine, Eastern Europe); 'developing countries' as all others. 3 Najam 1995. country representatives insist that for reasons of fairness and equity they should not be subject to emissions limits, rich countries counter by arguing in terms of impacts on industrial competitiveness and the cost effectiveness of policies. Even if major developing countries were prepared to take on emissions targets, the dispute over who should carry the burden of climate policies, and more generally over how global resources should be shared, will be difficult to resolve.
Europe is pushing for deeper commitments for a broader set of countries; the United States have rejected the Kyoto Protocol altogether, after earlier insisting on quantitative commitments for developing countries; and most developing countries have so far refused to even discuss future commitments. National circumstances differ greatly between groups of countries, and there are conflicting interests among developing countries. It is not clear yet what will be the negotiating positions of key developing countries in the lead-up to negotiations on the second commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol, due to begin in 2005.
The official climate negotiations have not tackled the issue of future commitments; most of the discussion to date has taken place among think tanks, academia and NGOs.
Developing Country Participation in Global Climate Policy
Equity issues have figured prominently in past and present climate negotiations, and the need to differentiate commitments between countries was recognised early on in the global environmental negotiations. The 1992 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) has enshrined in it the principle of 'common but differentiated responsibilities', and the notion that industrialized nations should lead the way. The Convention has been ratified by all major countries, including the United States, yet there is no global consensus about who should do how much to address the causes and impacts of climate change, and who should pay for it. One of the defining issues has been whether and when developing countries take emission targets. The Berlin Mandate of 1995, agreed to by all the major parties, stipulated that 'quantified emission limitation and reduction objectives' should be set for developed countries, but that no new commitments should be introduced for developing countries. This was the basis for the 1997 Kyoto Protocol. 
Forces Against a Second Commitment Period of the Kyoto Protocol…
The most fundamental question for the upcoming negotiations is whether there will indeed be a second commitment period under the Kyoto Protocol.
Opposition to Kyoto Protocol-style emissions targets is strong, with the United States as well as key developing countries claiming priority for economic growth over measures to limit or reduce emissions. Developing countries insist that they should be allowed to catch 9 See Najam et al. 2003 . 10 Oberthür and Ott 1999.
up economically and not be subject to emissions targets, which are often seen as potential impediments to economic development. Insofar as developing countries give priority to economic growth over environmental impacts they are in tune with the position of the current US administration. If a strong alliance of countries giving absolute priority to short-term economic interests over longer-term sustainability were to arise, this would dim the prospects for a successful second commitment period. If the United States and possibly other states remain outside the Kyoto framework, this will tend to weaken European resolve to push ahead with more ambitious targets. an accepted member of the global community. Seen in this light, the United States, as well as developing countries that have or aspire to a role in global politics, may find that taking on greenhouse commitments becomes a token of good global citizenship. The more countries participate, the less acceptable it will become for some to remain outside.
Ultimately however, domestic influences will remain the strongest driving forces, especially for the United States and other large countries. Growing realisation of the danger of climate change also improves the prospects for a meaningful agreement. The greater the perceived risks and costs of climate change -for example by way of greater frequency and ferocity of hurricanes and other extreme weather events in North Americathe greater will be the willingness to pay for measures to counteract it.
Greenhouse Targets for Developing Countries
The most contentious issue in the negotiations for the second commitment period is likely to be which countries take on emissions targets, and how those commitments should be differentiated. Developing countries could be allocated relatively generous targets, with correspondingly stricter targets in industrialized countries to ensure overall environmental effectiveness. That way, the same incentives to reduce emissions would apply in all participating countries, while poor countries would get compensation from selling permits to rich countries. A generous target was used to help draw Russia into the Kyoto Protocol.
Various rules for differentiating future targets that are based on equity principles have been proposed that would appeal to developing countries. The most prominent proposal is that of 'contraction and convergence '. 21 Under this model, global emissions would be reduced over time, and entitlements to emit would be proportional to population for each country after a transition period -a convergence towards equal per capita allocations across the globe. The underlying ethical position is that each human being has an equal right to the atmosphere, and if access to the atmosphere as a repository for greenhouse gases has to be rationed, then each person should be entitled to an equal share. To agree on equity models such as contraction and convergence would thus require a fundamental rethink in rich societies about what their fair share of global resources and the global environment is, to acknowledge that they have been using a far greater share than is rightfully theirs, and to drastically reduce their claim on global resources. There is no prospect of this happening any time soon, and thus little chance for schemes that would result in large financial transfers purely as compensation for the fact that rich countries are emitting more than developing countries. Further, schemes that are 'fair' at the national level do not necessarily translate into equitable outcomes domestically. The rents implicit in large permit allocations to poorer countries could be captured by elites.
Perhaps a system of differentiating commitments based on a combination of historical responsibility, potential for emission reductions and ability to pay could offer a way forward. Rules for indicative target levels based on a set of simple indicators, and a schedule for graduation of countries towards taking on commitments (possibly with nonbinding commitments for poorer countries to begin with), could be a starting point for the negotiations. 
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A further complication is how emissions from land-use change would be included in any future targets for countries with high rates of deforestation, such as Brazil and Indonesia.
On the one hand, emissions targets could provide an incentive mechanism to slow deforestation, with enormous potential side-benefits for biodiversity and local environments. Reducing vegetation clearing can be a simple and cheap way of slowing emissions growth in the short term, as is evident from Australia, where less land clearing is expected to partially offset continued strong growth in energy-related emissions. 25 On the other hand, including deforestation would introduce huge potential liabilities for some countries, if future deforestation rates were higher than anticipated. Enforcement of landuse policies can be appallingly deficient, as witnessed in Indonesia.
The Clean Development Mechanism
The Kyoto Protocol provides for greenhouse gas mitigation in developing countries by way of projects under the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM). Governments and companies that are subject to emission caps under the Kyoto Protocol can invest in projects to reduce emissions in developing countries, and offset some of their own emissions against position paper by the international climate NGO network (Climate Action Network 2003); and a number of proposals originating from research institutes, such as that by Michaelowa et al. 2003. 23 Under an intensity target, emissions permits are linked to GDP growth, thereby compensating for fluctuations that stem from changes in economic activity. Under non-binding targets, some developing countries would be given the option to walk away from their commitments without penalty if compliance turned out to be difficult or costly. See Philibert and Pershing 2001; and Jotzo and Pezzey 2004. 24 Bouille and Girardin 2002. 25 Australian Greenhouse Office 2002.
the savings from these projects. The CDM is attractive to developing countries because it can bring investment in efficient technology, partly paid for by emission credits, and with little risk of negative economic effects.
As Demand for CDM credits comes principally from European governments (in particular the Dutch), the Japanese government, some private companies, and the World Bank 'Prototype Carbon Fund'. The European emissions trading scheme allows for credits from CDM projects to be used as offsets, so more demand from private industry is expected. Demand for CDM projects and prices paid for emissions credits are low compared to earlier estimates, mainly because the United States as the largest potential buyer has pulled out, but also because it turns out that there is a larger than expected potential for low-cost greenhouse gas reduction projects. The downside from a host country perspective is that at low prices, many technology intensive options that are attractive because of their side-benefits -in particular, renewable energy technologies -are generally not viable as CDM projects.
A further complication is that under the CDM, it has to be established whether and by how much a given project actually reduces emissions, compared to what would have happened otherwise. Too strict an interpretation of the rules could choke investment in the CDM, while too loose an interpretation could result in bogus 'projects' that provide little benefits to host countries and diminish the overall environmental effects of the Protocol.
Developing country decisionmakers are aware of this. For example, Chinese government 26 Data from Ellis et al. 2004. officials have been reported as voicing concern that opportunities for China to obtain financial support and new technologies through the CDM could be spoiled, if rules are too lax.
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In the upcoming negotiations, developing countries can be expected to push for an expanded role of the CDM, with rules favouring projects with a strong technology transfer component and local side-benefits. However, developing countries' positions are divided over the potential role of forestry in the CDM, including projects to avoid deforestation (which are currently not part of the CDM). Brazil's was against including avoided deforestation projects under the Kyoto Protocol, apparently in part because such projects would mean losing control over parts of the Amazon to foreign interests.
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Adaptation to Climate Change
Climate change is going to happen even if global emissions growth can be slowed or reversed, because of long lags in the climate system. Increasingly, adaptation to climate change is coming into the spotlight, as the realisation dawns that there will inevitably be adverse impacts over the next decades. Tropical and subtropical countries are likely to be affected particularly badly by global warming. Impacts are expected in a wide range of systems, from water resources through agriculture to health. Storms, floods and droughts will be more frequent and more forceful. In many low-lying areas of Asia and the Pacific, sea-level rise is a threat to large populations.
29
Building the physical infrastructure and changing economic and social structures to deal with these effects will be costly. Equity issues come to the fore again: rich societies have been the main source of the problem so far, but the impacts will tend to affect poorer societies most, and systems in developing countries will often be less resilient to climate change to start with. Developing countries increasingly demand assistance from rich countries in dealing with adverse impacts of climate change. Adaptation measures provide immediate local benefits, in contrast to policies to reduce emissions which give global benefits over the long term.
As a consequence, the dynamics of negotiations and action will differ. There are clear incentives for each country or community to invest in protecting against climate change, as they reap the payoffs themselves.
Ironically however, the very fact that the incentive structure is simpler could exacerbate the equity problem, as incentives for rich countries to assist poor societies are much weaker in the case of adaptation. Whereas paying developing countries to reduce greenhouse gas emissions can be in industrialized countries' pure self-interest because it reduces the longrun extent of global climate change (and therefore the impacts on everyone), paying for adaptation in other countries is not, because benefits are local. Thus there is a case for a future treaty to take into account not just the level of economic development and opportunities for emissions reductions when defining commitments, but also each country's vulnerability and ability to adapt to climate change. 31 Adaptation could also be financed through multilateral funds such as the Global Environmental Facility (GEF), which would need greatly increased contributions from rich countries and a change in rules how funds are allocated to developing countries.
Adaptation to climate change is set to figure prominently in the negotiations at the COP10 climate conference in Buenos Aires in December 2005. This in itself has been seen as a significant success for developing countries -yet whether significant action will follow remains to be seen. 30 Müller 2002. 31 See Beg et al. 2002; and Najam et al. 2003 .
Conclusion
The gulf between the main players' positions on future international climate policy is deep, and the upcoming negotiations for the second commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol will show the prospects for global cooperation. The first commitment period could lay some groundwork, through action on emissions targets in some industrialized countries, greenhouse gas reductions in developing countries on a project-by-project basis, and by sending a signal to industry and policymakers everywhere that a carbon-constrained future may become reality. But a much more ambitious treaty is needed than the first round of the Kyoto Protocol, and developing countries must be involved.
Some observers have argued that what is needed is an 'historical compromise between the rich world and the poor', involving tight emissions targets and large payments to poor countries to compensate them for development options that they will have to forego. 32 How compensation there should be or needs to be is contentious, though it seems clear that some degree of North-South transfers will be necessary. No matter whether a future agreement relies on Kyoto-style emissions targets or on other mechanisms, the fundamental quest is to make economic activity more environmentally sustainable in all countries.
Rich nations will need to act at home, and assist poorer societies in the transformation to lower emissions trajectories. Developing countries in turn will need to recognize that they cannot follow the energy-intensive path that the rich world took.
Countries differ greatly in their stage of development, capacity to reduce greenhouse gases, and vulnerability to climate change, and these differences must be recognized. 
